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DNS traffic is transmitted in plaintext, resulting in privacy leakage.
To combat this problem, secure protocols have been used to encrypt
DNS messages. Existing studies have investigated the performance
overhead and privacy benefits of encrypted DNS communications,
yet little has been done from the perspective of censorship. In this
paper, we study the impact of the encrypted DNS on Internet cen-
sorship in two aspects. On one hand, we explore the severity of DNS
manipulation, which could be leveraged for Internet censorship,
given the use of encrypted DNS resolvers. In particular, we perform
7.4 million DNS lookup measurements on 3,813 DoT and 75 DoH
resolvers and identify that 1.66% of DoT responses and 1.42% of
DoH responses undergo DNS manipulation. More importantly, we
observe that more than two-thirds of the DoT and DoH resolvers
manipulate DNS responses from at least one domain, indicating
that the DNS manipulation is prevalent in encrypted DNS, which
can be further exploited for enhancing Internet censorship. On the
other hand, we evaluate the effectiveness of using encrypted DNS
resolvers for censorship circumvention. Specifically, we first dis-
cover those vantage points that involve DNS manipulation through
on-path devices, and then we apply encrypted DNS resolvers at
these vantage points to access the censored domains. We reveal
that 37% of the domains are accessible from the vantage points
in China, but none of the domains is accessible from the vantage
points in Iran, indicating that the censorship circumvention of using
encrypted DNS resolvers varies from country to country. More-
over, for a vantage point, using a different encrypted DNS resolver
does not lead to a noticeable difference in accessing the censored
domains.
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The Domain Name System (DNS) provides important mappings
between domain names and their numerical IP addresses to direct
users to Internet services. As a fundamental component of the
Internet, DNS was designed as an unencrypted protocol. However,
this allows eavesdroppers to sniff the domain that a user is going
to visit, raising a privacy concern. In order to mitigate this privacy
issue, secure protocols, such as DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [29] and DNS-
over-HTTPS (DoH) [25], have been proposed to encrypt DNS traffic,
and DNS service providers, such as Google and Cloudflare, have
gradually supported these protocols on their resolvers.
Considerable research efforts [12, 24, 28, 35, 47, 48] have been
devoted to assessing the performance overhead and privacy bene-
fits of using encrypted DNS, yet none of them has considered the
impact of encrypted DNS on Internet censorship. Complementary
to these prior studies, we provide the first comprehensive measure-
ment study to investigate the impact of encrypted DNS on Internet
censorship from two-fold: (1) the DNS manipulation occurred on
the use of encrypted DNS resolvers and (2) the effectiveness of
using encrypted DNS resolvers for censorship circumvention.
In this paper, we first explore the possibility of facilitating In-
ternet censorship through DNS manipulation when adopting en-
crypted DNS resolvers. Concretely, we collect DoT and DoH re-
solvers by actively scanning the Internet and passively analyzing
the public datasets. Then, we compile a list of sensitive and popular
domains and resolve the domains at the DoT and DoH resolvers to
identify the occurrence of DNS manipulation. Overall, we conduct
7.4 million DNS lookup measurements on 3,813 DoT and 75 DoH re-
solvers and identify that 1.66% of DoT responses and 1.42% of DoH
responses are manipulated. In addition, we discover that more than
two-thirds of the encrypted DNS resolvers manipulate at least one
domain’s DNS response, showing that the DNS manipulation in the
encrypted DNS is even more prevalent than that in the traditional
DNS [42], where only 11% of the resolvers have been identified to
manipulate DNS responses. Also, the resolvers of a provider could
behave very differently in terms of the number and category of the
censored domains, which implies the adoption of different policies
with an encrypted DNS provider.
On the other hand, encrypted DNS resolvers have the potentials
to help end-users circumvent Internet censorship, since encrypted
DNS traffic cannot be easily manipulated by on-path censorship
devices. We evaluate the effectiveness of using encrypted DNS re-
solvers for censorship circumvention. To do so, we first recruit
geographically distributed vantage points and detect the occur-
rence of DNS manipulation when using unencrypted DNS. Here,
we only focus on the DNS manipulation conducted by an on-path
censorship device as the DNS manipulation conducted by a resolver
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can be easily bypassed by switching to another traditional DNS
resolver. After that, we use encrypted DNS resolvers to perform
DNS resolution on the censored domains from the corresponding
vantage points and further verify the accessibility of the censored
domains. In total, we identify vantage points in five countries where
DNS manipulation is conducted by on-path censorship devices. By
using encrypted DNS resolvers from those vantage points, we find
that the effectiveness of encrypted DNS resolvers to circumvent
Internet censorship varies by country. For example, with the use of
encrypted DNS resolvers, all the vantage points in China are able to
access approximately 37% of the censored domains, but none of the
censored domains can be accessed from the vantage points in Iran.
Additionally, we observe no noticeable differences in accessing the
censored domains from different resolvers given a same vantage
point. Furthermore, we identify that those domains remain inac-
cessible because they also suffer other types of censorship, such as
IP-based blocking, HTTP-based blocking, and SNI-based blocking.
Note that considering the ethical concerns, we carefully design
these experiments to reduce potential risks on the vantage points
(see details in Section 5.2).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces the background of encrypted DNS and Internet censorship.
In Section 3, we describe our approach to evaluating the occurrence
of DNS manipulation given the use of encrypted DNS and present
the analysis results. The methodology and results on censorship
circumvention with encrypted DNS resolvers are detailed in Section
4. A further discussion on our study is presented in Section 5. We
survey the related work in Section 6, and finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the background of encrypted DNS and
censorship techniques that have been widely employed to prevent
users from visiting undesired websites.
2.1 Encrypted DNS
DNS is a distributed and hierarchical database that hosts resource
records of Internet services. As shown in Figure 1, to conduct a DNS
resolution, a client first issues a DNS query to a recursive resolver
that will then traverse the DNS hierarchical tree and return the
requested resource records back to the client. DNS was originally
designed as an unencrypted protocol, raising serious privacy con-
cerns and censorship issues. More specifically, an eavesdropper who
monitors the traffic on the wire can view and collect the client’s
browsing activities, or manipulate the DNS responses to control
the information access if the requested domain is undesired.
Encrypted DNS (e.g., DoT and DoH)1 was then proposed to
encrypt the DNS communications so as to address the privacy
leakage and DNSmanipulation. However, we notice that the current
development of encrypted DNS only secures the communication
channel between a client and resolvers, and the DNS messages
between the resolvers and nameservers remain unencrypted. As
a result, DNS manipulation between resolvers and nameservers
1Other than DoT and DoH, encrypted DNS protocols have other proposals such as
DNSCrypt [17]. In this study, we focus on DoT and DoH as they have been well-
standardized [25, 29] and well-supported [15, 22] by the industry.
Figure 1: Illustration of DNS and Encrypted DNS. The blue
lines plot unencrypted DNS traffic and the green line depicts
encrypted DNS traffic.
is still possible. In addition, as a resolver itself may have a list of
undesired domains, the use of encrypted DNS resolvers may also
suffer from DNS manipulation. On the other hand, encrypted DNS
prevents the DNS manipulation between clients and resolvers, so it
conceivably improves the client’s censorship-resistance.
2.2 Internet Censorship
Internet censorship has been widely witnessed for decades and
steadily increasing in recent years. To restrict the access to certain
information on the Internet, censor devices examine the network
traffic to block undesired contents of domains that are prohibited.
In doing so, censors usually check the destination IP addresses and
the domain names that are normally transmitted in plaintext. Here,
we briefly describe different types of censorship techniques that
are widely used to block access to certain Internet resources.
2.2.1 DNS Manipulation. Conducting DNS resolution is the very
first step for a client to access a domain. As we mentioned above,
the plaintext DNS is vulnerable to DNS manipulation since censors
on the path can accurately learn which domain a client is going to
visit and block DNS queries if the requested domain is prohibited.
In our study, wemainly consider DNSmanipulation in the follow-
ing two scenarios. First, resolvers receive DNS queries from their
customers, so they would be able to manipulate the DNS responses
if the DNS queries contain their prohibited domains. However, as
those resolvers can only manipulate the DNS responses replied
by themselves, it is fairly easy to bypass such DNS manipulation
by switching to a different DNS resolver that does not manipulate
DNS responses, such as Google Public DNS. Second, an on-path
censorship device can actively inspect the DNS messages on the
wire and manipulate the DNS responses if needed. A traditional
DNS resolver cannot avoid such a DNS manipulation, but an en-
crypted DNS resolver (beyond the censor’s scope) is immune to the
DNS manipulation as their DNS messages are encrypted.
2.2.2 HTTP-based Censorship. An HTTP request contains a Host
header that displays the domain name of a website. The Host header
was introduced to inform the web server which domain the client
attempts to connect to so that the web server could provide the
requested content when the web server hosts multiple domains.
Like the DNS protocol, the HTTP protocol is also unencrypted and
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2.2.3 SNI-based Censorship. HTTPS encrypts the HTTP messages
using TLS so that censors are unable to examine the Host header
in the HTTP requests. However, the domain name of a website is
still exposed during the process of the TLS handshake. In particular,
a web server may host multiple domains and different domains
may associate with different certificates. Thus, in order to present
a correct certificate, a client needs to inform the web server which
domain it connects to and the domain name is embedded in the
SNI extension of the Client Hello message, which is sent in plain-
text. As a result, a censor can block the HTTPS traffic based on the
domain name in the SNI extension. To bypass the SNI-based censor-
ship, encrypted SNI has been proposed and deployed in Cloudflare’s
networks [7, 14].
2.2.4 IP-based Censorship. Besides blocking traffic based on do-
main names described above, a censor may simply block users’
packets based on IP addresses. A censor can compile a list of IP
addresses that are hosting undesired content and block traffic to
and from those IP addresses. However, the IP-based censorship
could result in collateral damage [19, 26, 38, 52]. For example, IP
addresses are shared resources in CDNs, where contents of multiple
domains could be delivered from the same IP address. As a result,
blocking an IP address of a CDN’s edge server would also block
the access to other innocent domains. Such collateral damage is
significant since CDNs are widely adopted by many web services
[30].
3 CENSORSHIP OF ENCRYPTED DNS
In this section, we investigate DNS manipulation given the use of
encrypted DNS resolvers. The basic idea is to first collect a list of
DoT/DoH resolvers and compile a list of test domains that are likely
to be censored by authorities. Then, we resolve the domains with
the DoT/DoH resolvers and determine whether a DNS response is
valid.2
3.1 Discovering DoT and DoH Resolvers
A previous study [35] has already discovered more than one thou-
sand of DoT resolvers and tens of DoH resolvers, and a public
resolver list [16] is also available. However, it is unclear whether
those resolvers are still in service. Besides, since the concerns of
DNS privacy leakage and manipulation have attracted more atten-
tion in the industry recently, more DoT and DoH resolvers have
been deployed. Thus, we first perform a large-scale scanning to
discover and validate the operational DoT and DoH resolvers.
3.1.1 DoT resolvers. By default, DoT resolvers listen for TCP con-
nections on port 853 [29]. Therefore, our first step is to find out
all the IP addresses that have port 853 open. To do so, we leverage
Rapid7’s public dataset [44] that contains a monthly Internet-wild
SYN scan on TCP port 853. As the previous study [35] shows, the
churn of DoT resolvers are relatively high, we thereby select long-
term active DoT resolvers by analyzing 4 snapshots of scan results
conducted from Jun 2020 to September 2020 and extracting the IP
addresses that have TCP port 853 open in every scan during this
2Note that the DNS manipulation could happen on the resolver itself or the on-path
censorship devices placed between the resolver and the corresponding nameservers.
In the paper, we do not distinguish these two scenarios. We identify DNS manipulation
if through the resolver we cannot obtain a valid DNS response.
Table 1: Ethical Resolver Selection.
DoT Resolver DoH Resolver
Total 6,016 82
Invalid Certificate 1,880 0
Low Stability 318 7
Ethical 3,813 75
period. In total, we obtain 1.99 million IP addresses. After that, we
validate if the hosts with those IP addresses are functional DoT
resolvers by sending DoT requests to those IP addresses, resolving
a domain name under our control. We then determine a host as a
functional DoT resolver if it sends back the correct IP address of our
domain name. In the end, we successfully validate 6,016 functional
DoT resolvers.
3.1.2 DoH resolvers. Unlike the DoT resolvers that operate on
the exclusive port 853, DoH resolvers operate on port 443 that
is used by web servers to support HTTPS connections and the
URL of the resolvers is not well-defined. Therefore, it is inefficient
to actively scan all the possible URLs to identify DoH resolvers.
Instead, we simply search for public known DoH resolvers from
online documents [1, 2]. Still, like the DoT resolvers, we validate
if a DoH resolver is functional by resolving our domain name and
examine DNS responses. In total, we obtain 82 functional DoH
resolvers. Although the number of DoH resolvers is much less than
that of the DoT resolvers, we believe that we obtained the majority
of open DoH resolvers since we collected more DoH resolvers than
a recent study [35], which actively scanned billions of URLs to
identify DoH resolvers.
3.1.3 Ethical Resolver Selection. During our experiments, the DoT
and DoH resolvers are used to resolve domains potentially being
censored (Section 3.2). Therefore, it is necessary to carefully design
the experiments to reduce the risks on participants. To do so, we
follow an ethical principle discussed in Iris [42], i.e., we only use the
resolvers that are unlikely to be associatedwith any individual users,
as our guideline to perform experiments. To this end, we design two
filtering processes to identify resolvers that are well maintained for
public services. Table 1 presents the resolver selection results.
First, the previous study [35] found that some DoT resolvers in-
stalled invalid certificates, and the use of invalid certificates strongly
indicates that the resolvers are not well maintained as a public ser-
vice. Thus, we actively validate certificates of DoT resolvers and
exclude invalid ones. In total, we identify 1,880 DoT resolvers with
invalid certificates, leaving us 4,136 DoT resolvers with valid cer-
tificates. We also check the certificates of DoH resolvers, and all of
them are valid.
In addition, as the stability of a resolver is critical to the public
service and its users, a well-maintained resolver should not have
significant downtime. Therefore, we test if the resolvers are steadily
active by resolving our domain name every hour for consecutive
10 days, and exclude those that demonstrate any failed responses.
In total, we discard 318 DoT and 7 DoH resolvers with unreliable
availability. As a result, we obtain 3,818 ethical DoT resolvers and
75 ethical DoH resolvers for our experiments.
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With the ethical DoT and DoH resolvers, we then identify the
service providers of these resolvers. For a DoH resolver that is al-
ways associated with a URL, we directly use the apex domain (i.e.,
second-level domain name) to recognize the provider of the DoH re-
solver. For DoT resolvers, however, we only have their IP addresses.
Reverse DNS lookup is a straightforward way to obtain the domain
name of a resolver, but we find that many PTR records of the IP
addresses do not exist or they point to the domains of the hosting
service providers. As such, to obtain the provider of a DoT resolver,
we resort to the certificate carried by the resolver. Specifically, we
determine the provider as the second-level domain of the Common
Name (CN) in the certificate’s subject field. Table 2 presents the
providers of ethical DoT and DoH resolvers. Overall, our ethical re-
solvers are from 461 DoT providers and 47 DoH providers. Also, we
observe three large DoT providers, i.e., CleanBrowsing, Cloudflare,
and NextDNS, which, in total, account for 77% of the resolvers and
most of their IP addresses are concentrated in a few /24 subnets.
For example, 255 IP addresses in 172.64.37.0/24 are DoT resolvers
provided by Cloudflare.
3.2 Test Domain List
In order to obtain a list of domains that may be censored, we follow
the standard approach used in prior studies [39, 42, 49], which
compile a test domain list including popular domains and sensitive
domains. We extract Alexa top 1,000 domains [3] as our popular
domains and select the sensitive domains from the Citizen Lab’s
[4] global list, which contains 1,302 entries. Note that the entries
provided by Citizen Lab are in the form of URLs, and we extract
domains from the URLs to form our sensitive domains. After we
deduplicate the popular and sensitive domains and exclude the
problematic ones (i.e., we cannot obtain an HTTP response with
200 OK status code when we access the landing page of the domain
or the domain installs an invalid certificate), we end up with 1,909
domains. We further determine the category of the domains with
the classification services provided by FortiGuard [21].
3.3 DNS Response Validation
We resolve those test domains with the encrypted DNS resolvers
and verify if the DNS responses contain valid IP addresses. If a DNS

































Figure 2: Validation Process to Determine the Occurrence of
DNSCensorship. Each bar shows the percentages of requests
that can be identified by the certain validation process.
response cannot be validated, we consider that the DNS response
is manipulated by the encrypted DNS resolver. However, it is very
challenging to determine whether a DNS response is valid for a
domain since the domain could have multiple valid IP addresses
and it is impossible to enumerate all of them. To overcome this
problem, we apply the following procedure to validate each DNS
response.
3.3.1 Resource Record Validation. We set up a control node that
does not suffer DNS manipulation to resolve the test domains, and
then we compare the results with the DNS responses collected from
the encrypted DNS resolvers.
First, if we obtain a failure DNS record, such as NXDOMAIN,
SERVFAIL, etc., from an encrypted DNS resolver or the DNS record
contains a non-routable IP address, such as 127.0.0.1, but our control
node obtains a public routable IP address of a domain, we consider
that the DNS response of the corresponding domain is manipulated.
Second, if the encrypted DNS resolver receives a public routable IP
address and it is in the same Autonomous System (AS) as the IP ad-
dress obtained by our control node, we consider that the encrypted
DNS resolver obtains a valid IP address. This is because that DNS is
widely used to balance the traffic to different web servers (e.g., DNS
load-balancing in CDN [23, 31]), and therefore different resolvers
may receive different IP addresses in the same time window, but
those IP addresses are normally possessed by the same AS.
If the encrypted DNS resolver receives a public routable IP ad-
dress but it does not belong to the same AS of the IP address ob-
tained by the control node, we then validate the IP address with
the certificate and the HTTP webpage described below.
3.3.2 Certificate Validation. In order to establish an HTTPS con-
nection, a web server needs to present a valid, non-expired certifi-
cate, which carries valid signatures and is issued to the requested
domain, i.e., the domain name must appear in the Subject field or
the Subject Alternative Names extension of the certificate.
As such, we validate an IP address by retrieving the certificate
from that address. If the certificate can be successfully validated,
we consider the IP address received by the encrypted DNS resolver
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Figure 3: CDF of Manipulated Responses per Resolver.
domains with an invalid certificate in our test domains, so all the
remaining domains should have valid certificates if they support
HTTPS. Thus, if we identify an invalid certificate now, it could be
provided by the servers controlled by the resolver providers or the
on-path censorship devices, and those servers are used to provide
blockpages.
Next, if a website does not support HTTPS and serves the valid
content through HTTP, there is no certificate available for us to
retrieve. We then validate the IP address through HTTP validation.
3.3.3 HTTP Validation. To perform HTTP validation, we first re-
trieve the domain’s landing page using the IP address obtained by
the encryptedDNS resolver and that obtained from our control node.
Since we have excluded the problematic domains in our domain
list, our control node only receives a 200 OK or 3XX redirection
HTTP response. As a result, if we cannot obtain a valid HTTP
response or the HTTP response does not present a correct status
code, we determine that the corresponding IP address obtained by
the encrypted DNS resolver is invalid.
After that, for the rest of the DNS responses, their corresponding
HTTP responses, retrieved from IP addresses obtained by encrypted
DNS resolver and our control node respectively, would have the
same 200 OK or 3XX redirection status code. In such cases, if they
have the same 3XX redirection status code and their Location
headers redirect the traffic to the same domain, we determine that
the IP address is valid and vice versa. If they have the same 200 OK
status code, we will further examine their HTML content. Specifi-
cally, we first check if the two HTML webpages present the same
<title> tag. If so, we consider the IP address is valid. Otherwise,
we manually review the webpages to determine their validity. Note
that the manual effort is trivial as most of the DNS responses can
be determined without manual review.
3.4 Observation of DNS Manipulation
In total, we conduct 7.4 million DNS lookup measurements, resolv-
ing 1,909 domains from 3,813 DoT and 75 DoH resolvers. During
the experiment, we retry a DNS query at most 3 times if we do
not receive a DNS response from an encrypted DNS resolver. If all
retries fail, we further attempt to resolve the domain under our
control from the encrypted DNS resolver to test whether the re-
solver operates as we expected. We then discard 152 of DoT and 3
Table 3: Blocking Behaviors.
Blocking Behaviors DoT Responses DoH Responses
NXDOMAIN 93,229 (80.20%) 398 (20.46%)
SERVFAIL 1,160 (1.00%) 404 (20.77%)
REFUSED 288 (0.25%) 21 (1.08%)
Empty Record 509 (0.44%) 29 (1.49%)
Reserved IP 7,021 (6.04%) 513 (26.38%)
Forged Public IP 14,036 (12.07%) 580 (29.82%)
of DoH resolvers as they fail the test. To this end, after removing
those resolvers, our dataset consists of 7.1 million DNS responses.
Overall, we identify that 116,243 of DoT responses (1.66%) and
1,945 of DoH responses (1.42%) are manipulated. Figure 2 shows
the results of validation processes for determining the occurrence
of DNS censorship. The validity of most DNS responses can be
determined by the resource record validation, especially for those
unmanipulated. Meanwhile, only a small portion of responses re-
quire HTTP validation, but most of which (93.76%) are identified
as manipulated responses.
3.4.1 Manipulated DNS Responses. Figure 3 shows the CDF of
the number of manipulated responses by each resolver. In total,
69.7% of the DoT resolvers and 66.7% of the DoH resolvers ma-
nipulate DNS responses for at least one domain, while 2.4% of
the DoT resolvers and 5.6% of the DoH resolvers manipulate the
responses for more than 100 domains. In comparison to the previ-
ous study [42] where 11% of the open resolvers manipulate DNS
responses, the DNS manipulation in encrypted DNS resolvers is
even more prevalent and severe. In particular, we observe that
two DoT resolvers, 78.47.230.59 and 94.130.183.67 located in
Germany, manipulate DNS responses of 728 domains, which are
the two most among all the DoT resolvers. Meanwhile, a DoH
resolver, https://dns.alidns.com/dns-query operated by Al-
ibaba in China, manipulates the most domains’ DNS responses
among all the DoH resolvers. We believe that such DNS manipula-
tions are actually conducted by China’s Great Firewall (GFW), and
we will discuss the details in Section 5.1.
We identify 1,370 and 652 domains that are censored by at least
one of the DoT and DoH resolvers, respectively. The most cen-
sored domain by DoT resolvers is use-application-dns.net, a
canary domain3 that is used as a test to disable the DoH feature
in Firefox browsers, and the domain that is censored the most by
DoH resolvers is adultfriendfinder.com, a website serving adult
information.
Table 3 shows the blocking behaviors of encrypted DNS resolvers.
Most of the manipulated responses by DoT resolvers present an
NXDOMAIN message, and a few show a SERVFAIL or REFUSED
code. Meanwhile, for DoH resolvers, the numbers of manipulated
responses with NXDOMAIN and SERVFAIL code are roughly the
same, but the responses with REFUSED are much less. Furthermore,
we observe that a few manipulated DoT and DoH responses have
3A network administrator can set a DNS failure response to such a domain as a signal
for a Firefox browser to learn that the network is unsuitable or undesired for DoH
resolvers configured by Firefox [36].
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Table 4: Top 5 IP Addresses in the Manipulated Responses













† 202 DoT resolvers and 13 DoH resolvers return 0.0.0.0, and we
show the provider of the resolver that returns the IP address
the most.
a valid format but without an IP address. A significant amount of
manipulated responses contain forged IP addresses that are reserved
IP addresses or invalid public IP addresses. The top 5 IP addresses
in the manipulated responses are listed in Table 4. Specifically,
0.0.0.0 is the most used IP address. For those forged public IP
addresses listed, each of them belongs to a corresponding resolver
provider, and a blockpage is hosted on each IP address. Finally,
the DoT and DoH providers may configure multiple IP addresses
that are associated with blockpages, e.g., cleanbrowsing.org and
cira.ca in Table 4.
3.4.2 DNS Manipulation by Providers. Next, we investigate the
DNS manipulation policies of different providers by aggregating
the observations of resolvers deployed by a same provider, as de-
tailed in Table 5. In particular, the DoT providers censor significantly
more domains than the DoH providers. For example, alidns.com
censors the most domains among DoH providers, but the number
of its censored domains is still less than that of the 5th of DoT
providers. Interestingly, we observe that the number of censored
domains by different resolvers from a same provider could vary
significantly. For example, more than 95% of the DoT resolvers
of cleanbrowsing.org manipulate DNS response of a similar do-
main set that contains around 83 domains, while a few resolvers
in the address ranges of 185.228.168.2XX and 185.228.169.2XX
manipulate the DNS responses associated with hundreds of more
domains, making a total of 410 domains. We infer that such a differ-
ence could originate from the different policies at different service
plans offered by the encrypted DNS provider.
Moreover, from Table 5, we can see that the top DoT providers
tend to manipulate DNS responses of domains that publish news
and provide online search services, while the top DoH providers
tend to manipulate the DNS responses of domains that provide
proxy services or serve pornography contents.
3.4.3 Commonly Censored Domains. Table 6 lists the top 5 com-
monly censored domains as well as the top 5 commonly censored
domain categories. A category is considered as being blocked if at
Table 5: DNS Manipulation by Providers. The Categories col-




kidgonet.de 728 NEWS, SHOP, INFO
cleanbrowsing.org 410 PORN, PROX, SRCH
ideame.top 332 NEWS, SRCH, PROX
waitquietly.com 326 NEWS, SRCH, PROX
el3c.de 315 SRCH, INFO, NEWS
DoH
alidns.com 290 NEWS, SRCH, PROX
cleanbrowsing.org 134 PORN, PROX, ADUL
opendns.com 125 PROX, PORN, ADUL
rubyfish.cn 119 NEWS, PORN, PROX
brahma.world 87 GAMB, INFO, SRCH
† The abbreviations of domain categories are specified in Table 12.
Table 6: Top 5 Commonly Censored Domains and Top 5
Commonly Censored Domain Categories by Providers. NoP:
Number of Providers.
Domains NoP Categories NoP
DoT
www.mgid.com 270 INFO 301
doubleclick.net 265 BUSI 284
www.exoclick.com 264 GAMB 276
pingomatic.com 261 ADVR 274
use-application-dns.net 230 BLOG 270
DoH
adultfriendfinder.com 12 INFO 19
www.livejasmin.com 11 ADUL 16
www.exoclick.com 10 PORN 16
use-application-dns.net 10 SRCH 16
www.hotspotshield.com 9 BUSI 15
least one domain that falls into the category is blocked. For DoT
providers, the top 3 commonly censored domains are all advertis-
ing platforms, indicating that ad-blocking services are popularly
adopted by the DoT providers. With respect to domain categories,
information-related categories such as information technology,
business, and advertisement are ranked in high positions.
For DoH providers, the top 2 commonly censored domains are
related to adult content, indicating that family protection policies
are widely supported by DoH providers. Meanwhile, information
technology is also ranked on the top of the censored categories,
followed by two adult-related categories.
In comparison to the results in the previous study [42] show-
ing that open resolvers incline to manipulate DNS responses of
pornography, gambling, and P2P sharing domains, encrypted DNS
providers are usually in favor of manipulating the DNS responses
of information technology domains.
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Figure 4: DNS Manipulation Detection. Our vantage points
should receive a static DNS response from our control server
if no DNS manipulation occurs, and vice versa.
4 CIRCUMVENTIONWITH ENCRYPTED DNS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of adopting DoT/DoH
resolvers for circumventing Internet censorship. The basic idea is
to identify the vantage points (e.g., VPN severs) that suffer DNS
manipulation, from which perform DNS resolution on the censored
domains via DoT/DoH resolvers, and then attempt to visit those
domains for assessing the accessibility.
4.1 Vantage Points
To conduct extensive experiments, we need a pool of vantage points
distributed across the world, which can issue plaintext DNS re-
quests, DoT/DoH requests, and HTTP/HTTPS requests. One of
the straightforward methods is to use crowdsourcing platforms to
recruit volunteers for performing the experiments, but it may raise
some ethical concerns when the volunteers attempt to access the
domains that are supposed to be censored in their locations. As a
result, we utilize commercial VPN servers as our vantage points,
same as the strategy adopted by a well-established measurement
platform, ICLab [39], which has been using VPN servers to detect
censorship activities for two years and no ethical issues have been
reported. Moreover, commercial VPN services have been widely
used to bypass Internet censorship, and hence the VPN operators
understand the risks of deploying their servers in a country.
However, it is hard to find VPN service providers that deploy
physical VPN servers in China, while the GFW in China is known
to perform DNS manipulation [8, 42]. Therefore, we instead launch
instances in cloud services as the vantage points in China to conduct
our experiments.
In total, we obtain vantage points from five commercial VPN
providers that deploy more than one thousand VPN servers across
over one hundred countries. As the vantage points in China, we
operate four instances in cloud services launched from different
locations.
4.2 DNS Manipulation Detection
Since encrypted DNS prevents the DNSmanipulation between users
and resolvers, it could help users circumvent Internet censorship.
However, as we mentioned in Section 2.2.1, DNS manipulation can
be done by an on-path censorship device. To assess the effectiveness
of the censorship circumvention enabled by DoT/DoH resolvers,
we need to identify, at each vantage point, the domains censored
by on-path censorship devices, and those domains that will be used
in the circumvention test (see Section 4.3.2).
Table 7: DoT/DoH Resolvers.





As such, we design an approach that can accurately identify the
DNS manipulation conducted by on-path censorship devices, as
illustrated in Figure 4. In particular, we first set up a control server
that replies to arbitrary DNS requests with a static DNS response.
Then, we issue the DNS requests from the vantage points to our
control server, resolving test domains. If a DNS request triggers
an on-path device, our vantage point will receive a manipulated
DNS response that will be different from the static DNS response
provided by the control server. Hence, it is straightforward to detect
the DNS manipulation by comparing the received DNS response
with the static DNS response, i.e., the ground-truth. For the purpose
of identifying which domains are censored at each vantage point,
we use the same test domain list in Section 3.2 as the test base.
Ideally, our detection method does not introduce any false nega-
tives or false positives since our control server provides a ground
truth of resolution responses. However, ISPs may deploy DNS cache
proxies as a part of network infrastructures to serve their users
so that popular DNS records can be reused, improving the perfor-
mance of DNS resolution [34]. These cache proxies may intercept
the connections between our vantage points and control server,
perform their own DNS resolution on the behalf of our vantage
points, and finally return valid DNS responses to the requested
domains. As such, a valid DNS response will be different from the
static DNS response provided by our control server, and we will
falsely identify them as the activities of DNS manipulation.
To eliminate those false positives, we conduct a cache test to
exclude those vantage points that could be impacted by cache prox-
ies. Specifically, we resolve a separate domain operated by us at
our control server, which will serve as an incorrect, static DNS
response. Meanwhile, an authentic DNS response of this domain
is also hosted at its legitimate nameserver. If a DNS cache proxy
presents, it will resolve our domain through the normal resolution
path and provide us an authentic DNS response. If not, the tested
DoT/DoH resolver will reach our control server and obtain the
static response.
4.3 Circumvention Measurement
With the censored domains identified at each vantage point, we
conduct our tests for the circumvention. From each vantage point,
we resolve each censored domain through DoT and DoH resolvers
and retrieve the domain’s landing page with the IP address returned
by those encrypted DNS resolvers. Then, we analyze the accessibil-
ity of the domain and examine the root cause if the domain is still
inaccessible.
4.3.1 Resolver Selection. Although we have collected a large num-
ber of DoT/DoH resolvers (Section 3.1), it is inefficient and unnec-
essary to test all the resolvers from each vantage point since it will
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Figure 5: Flow Chart of Circumvention Test for a Pair of Re-
solver and Censored Domain.
generate too much traffic on the vantage point. Therefore, as shown
in Table 7, we select resolvers from three well-known encrypted
DNS service providers: Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. Moreover,
we also set up a new resolver to represent all other unpopular
resolvers.
Note that the resolvers from the three popular providers are
typically operated at multiple IP addresses, and we only evaluate
the most well-known ones summarized in Table 7.4 We confirm that
there is no DNS manipulation occurred in these popular resolvers.
4.3.2 Circumvention Test. For testing the feasibility of circumven-
tion, we must not, and cannot, directly configure a DoT or DoH
resolver as the default resolver of the vantage point. Instead, we
manually specify the DoT/DoH resolver when performing a DNS
resolution. Also, it is possible that the resolvers are blocked in the
region of our vantage points. Therefore, we first test the reachabil-
ity of a DoT/DoH resolver by resolving our domain through the
resolver and validating the response. If the resolver is not reachable,
we exclude it from the circumvention test of the corresponding
vantage point.
We then perform the circumvention test with those censored do-
mains and reachable resolvers. We consider that an encrypted DNS
resolver can be used to circumvent the censorship if the vantage
point can retrieve the legitimate web content from the censored
domain. In particular, we will follow any HTTP redirection if it
presents. Figure 5 depicts a flow chart of the circumvention test for
4Quad9’s resolvers at 9.9.9.9 do enable some censorship policies, but Quad9 also
provides uncensored resolvers at 9.9.9.10 [5].
Table 8: DNS Manipulation Observation.





United States (1) 6
a pair of a censored domain and a resolver. First, we resolve the
domain through the resolver. As those popular DoT/DoH resolvers
do not perform DNS manipulation, we expect to obtain the authen-
tic IP addresses. We then randomly select an IP address from the
returned IP pool and determine a protocol, either HTTP or HTTPS,
to visit the domain.
Here, we describe our method of determining the protocol for
fetching the webpages. For a particular pair of a resolver and a
domain, we first attempt to make a TLS handshake with the IP
address at port 443 from a node that does not experience censorship.
If the TLS handshake succeeds, we will issue HTTPS requests for
this pair. Otherwise, we will use HTTP. We give priority to the
HTTPS since, compared to the HTTP, it is less likely to be blocked
due to the fact that (1) the majority of the websites support HTTPS
connections and many of them would redirect HTTP connections
to HTTPS connections [18] and (2) previous studies [49] show
that the HTTP-based censorship is much more prevalent than the
HTTPS (i.e., SNI-based) censorship. Moreover, if we encounter an
HTTP redirection, we then use the protocol indicated in the HTTP
redirection response to fetch the webpages.
For the domains we use HTTPS connections, we first attempt to
make a TCP handshake from the vantage point. If the connection
is failed (i.e., the connection timeouts or we receive an RST or
FIN packet), we consider that the IP address is blocked. Otherwise,
we further proceed with the TLS handshake and include the SNI
extension in the Client Hellomessage. If the connection becomes
failed or an invalid certificate is received, we determine that the
domain experiences SNI-based censorship. If the TLS handshake
succeeds, we send an HTTP GET request. If the HTTP response
requires a redirection, we then form a new URL and rerun the test
with the new URL; otherwise, we conclude that the tested domain
becomes accessible with the adoption of the DoT or DoH resolver.
For the domains we determine to use HTTP connections, we
first make a TCP handshake from the vantage point as well. If the
connection is failed, the IP address is determined as blocked. Other-
wise, we send an HTTP GET request. Then, if the connection fails,
we determine that the domain experiences HTTP-based censorship.
If the response indicates redirection, we then form a new URL and
rerun the test for the new URL. Otherwise, we examine whether
the web content presents a blockpage. To do so, we first obtain the
webpage of the corresponding domain from a node that does not
experience censorship, and we compare its <title> tag to that of
the webpage obtained from the vantage point. If they are matched,
we determine that the DoT or DoH resolver obtained a legitimate
webpage. Otherwise, wemanually review the webpage to determine
whether it is a blockpage returned by an on-path censor.
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Table 9: Accessibility of Censored Domains with DoT/DoH Resolvers.
Vantage Points
Cloudflare Google Quad9 Self-built
DoT DoH DoT DoH DoT DoH DoT DoH
China (Chengdu) 37.81% 37.10% 37.81% —† 38.16% 37.10% 37.10% 37.81%
China (Qingdao) 35.84% 36.52% 37.54% — 37.20% 36.51% 37.20% 37.20%
China (Shanghai) 37.33% 37.33% — — 36.64% 37.33% 36.30% 36.30%
China (Shenzhen) 36.39% 36.39% — — 36.05% 36.05% 36.05% 36.05%
Denmark 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Iran — — — — 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Portugal 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
United States 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
† The “—” sign indicates that the resolver is not reachable from the vantage point.
4.4 Results of Circumvention Test
4.4.1 DNS Manipulation. We detect the DNS manipulation con-
ducted by on-path devices from vantage points in 5 countries, listed
in Table 8. More specifically, in China, all four vantage points ex-
perience DNS manipulation and they observe a very similar set
of censored domains, resulting in a total of 298 censored domains.
In Iran, we identify one vantage point that observes the DNS ma-
nipulation on 197 domains. Note that it is the only vantage point
available for us to use in Iran during our experiments. Meanwhile,
we find that only one vantage point observes DNS manipulation
on a few domains5 (6, 3, 6) in Denmark, Portugal, and the United
States, respectively, indicating that the DNS manipulation in those
three countries is not nation-wide censorship.
Although the previous study [42] shows that DNS manipulation
is prevalent across the world, our results show that DNS manipu-
lation by on-path devices only happens in a few countries. Thus,
we infer that the majority of DNS manipulation observed in [42]
should have been conducted by DNS resolvers. A similar obser-
vation has been made by ICLab [39], which only detects the DNS
manipulation by on-path devices in three countries.
4.4.2 Accessibility of Censored Domains. Table 9 lists the percent-
age of the censored domains that can be accessed when DoT/DoH
resolvers are used. In particular, we observe that the Google DoH
resolver is unreachable from vantage points in China, and DoT and
DoH resolvers from Cloudflare and Google are unreachable from
the vantage point in Iran. On the other hand, although we observe
the vantage points in Shanghai and Shenzhen can correctly resolve
our domain through the Google DoT resolver at the beginning of
our experiment, as the experiments progress, two-thirds of the con-
nections to the Google DoT resolver become being blocked. Thus,
we here mark the Google DoT resolver as unreachable from these
two vantage points.
For a particular vantage point, we observe that different resolvers
have approximately the same capability to help users access the
censored domains. In other words, switching to another encrypted
DNS resolver does not make a noticeable difference in accessing
the censored domains. On the other hand, the effectiveness of using
encrypted DNS resolvers to circumvent censorship varies from
5All of the domains are related to file sharing services.
country to country. For example, when a DoT or DoH resolver is
reachable, we identify that all the censored domains of the vantage
point in Portugal can be accessed, and 50% of the censored domains
of the vantage point in Denmark become accessible. Also, around
37% of the censored domains are accessible from all the vantage
points in China, and all the sets of accessible domains are highly
similar. However, none of the censored domains is accessible from
the vantage point in Iran or the United States, indicating that the
censors enforce very strict policies on blocking those domains.
Furthermore, we investigate the circumvention rates, with re-
spect to the categories of censored domains. Since the DoT/DoH
resolvers enable access to a similar set of censored domains for all
the vantage points in China, we only present the results observed
from one vantage point (Qingdao) through our self-built DoH re-
solver. Table 10 lists the top 5 categories of censored domains and
their circumvention rates in China. We can see that the domains in
three categories, i.e., news and media, search engines/portals, and
reference, have a relatively low circumvention rate, while for the
other two categories, proxy avoidance and pornography, a circum-
vention rate of more than 70% can be achieved. Besides China, we
observe that 50% and 100% of the censored file sharing domains
become accessible for the vantage points in Denmark and Portugal,
respectively.
For all the censored domains that are still not accessible when
using reachable DoT and DoH resolvers, we further explore the
blocking techniques that prevent the access to these domains. Again,
we notice that the observations across different resolvers from the
same vantage point do not have a noticeable difference, and hence
we only present the results observed by our self-built DoH resolver,
as listed in Table 11. More specifically, the SNI-based censorship is
the most observable blocking technique for all the vantage points
since the majority of connections are made through HTTPS. Also,
all the vantage points in China present a similar distribution of
the blocking techniques, along with a very similar set of censored
domains as well.
In addition, we only observe IP-based blocking in China and Iran,
and it is much less popular than the domain-name-based (i.e., HTTP-
based and SNI-based) blocking techniques. This is most likely due
to the collateral damage of directly blocking the IP addresses (Sec-
tion 2.2.4). It is worth noting that a few domains are blocked during
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Table 10: China’s Top Censored Domain Categories and
their Circumvention Rates. Observed from the vantage
point in Qingdao, China, and tested with our self-built DoH
resolver.
Categories Total Circumvented
News and Media 55 18 (32.7%)
Search Engines and Portals 50 5 (10.0%)
Proxy Avoidance 28 22 (78.6%)
Reference 17 0 (0.0%)
Pornography 17 12 (70.6%)
their redirection phase (the numbers of such domains are listed in
the parentheses of Table 11), and they are only observed by the
vantage points in China. For example, the HTTPS requests sent
from the vantage points in China to https://torrentz.eu are
not blocked, but redirection responses are received and they indi-
cate a new location of https://torrentz2.is/. Then, the HTTPS
requests sent to https://torrentz2.is/ are censored by the SNI-
based blocking.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Importance of Deployment
As we mentioned in Section 2.2.1, DNS manipulation could be done
by a resolver itself or on-path censorship devices. During our ex-
periments, we notice that the set of censored domains that were
blocked when using Alibaba’s encrypted DNS resolvers (Section
3.4.2) deployed in China, is very similar to the set of censored do-
mains observed from vantage points at different locations in China
(Section 4.4.1), implying that the censored domains being observed
from Alibaba’s encrypted DNS resolvers are actually censored by
an on-path censorship device, i.e., GFW.
Given such an observation, we consider that the deployment of
encrypted DNS resolvers is critical for the providers to offer reli-
able services. Therefore, we recommend encrypted DNS providers
deploy their resolvers in the regions that do not suffer DNS ma-
nipulation by on-path censorship devices, and the existence of an
on-path censorship device can be easily determined by the simple
approach we proposed in Figure 4.
5.2 Ethical Considerations
Since our study does not involve the collection of personal infor-
mation or human participation, it falls outside the purview of IRBs
[32]. However, censorship studies often still pose ethical concerns
due to active, large-scale measurement-based experiments. As a
result, we carefully consider the ethical issues in our experiment
design, and we highlight our key procedures to reduce the risk on
the vantage points.
To study DNS manipulation at the use of encrypted DNS, we
design two filtering processes to screen out the resolvers that are
possibly associated with individuals. The two filtering processes
include identifying the resolvers with invalid certificates and low
stability, strongly indicating that the resolvers are not well main-
tained as a public service.
Table 11: Techniques for Blocking Censored Domains when
Encrypted DNS is used. The results are observed by our self-
built DoH resolver. The numbers in the parentheses are the




China (Chengdu) 59 5 (3) 112 (4)
China (Qingdao) 60 5 (3) 119 (6)
China (Shanghai) 59 5 (3) 122 (4)
China (Shenzhen) 60 5 (3) 123 (5)
Denmark 0 0 3
Iran 3 1 193
United States 0 1 5
To assess the effectiveness of encrypted DNS to circumvent
censorship, we need to make connections to the domains that are
supposed to be blocked in the region of vantage points. Therefore,
to avoid potential risks on any individuals, we restrain our vantage
points to VPN servers and cloud instances that are demonstrated
to be ethical for censorship studies in previous research [39, 43].
In addition, we rate-limit the requests sent by each vantage
point to minimize their traffic burden. Also, we attempt to avoid
the request aggregation at nameservers and web servers involved
in our experiments by randomizing the request sequence of the
tested domains at each vantage point.
5.3 Limitation
While studying DNS manipulation at the use of DoT and DoH re-
solvers in Section 3, we only evaluated open DoT and DoH resolvers.
However, ISPs and organizations may also provide DoT and DoH
resolvers to their users but not open to the public, thereby we may
miss a portion of the DoT and DoH resolvers. However, the previous
study [35] showed that the deployment of local DoT resolvers is
rare, and thus it would not impact the scale of our study.
Because our circumvention tests are mainly conducted at the
VPN servers that are usually hosted in a cloud environment, we lack
the capability to evaluate the circumvention of encrypted DNS in a
residential environment. Also, VPN providers have been recognized
to often lie about their servers’ locations [50]. To mitigate this issue,
we conduct traceroute from the VPN server to a node outside its
advertised country and collect (1) the nationality of intermediate
routers by looking up the geolocation database [6], and (2) the
domain names of routers by issuing reverse DNS lookups to search
for any geolocation hints (e.g., country code, city, or airport code).
If any geolocation information confirms the country of the VPN
server as advertised, we consider its location to be validated.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Encrypted DNS
Prior studies have investigated encrypted DNS mainly from the
privacy and performance perspectives. However, none of them has
explored the impact of encrypted DNS on Internet censorship. Here,
we briefly survey the previous research on performance overhead
and privacy benefits of encrypted DNS.
493
Understanding the Impact of Encrypted DNS on Internet Censorship WWW ’21, April 19–23, 2021, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Lu et al. [35] conducted large-scale measurements on the server
availability, client reachability, and performance of DoT and DoH
resolvers, demonstrating that their reachability is satisfying and
the induced performance overhead is tolerable. Bottger et al. [12]
further examined the performance overhead of DoH, and they made
an observation that DoH would lead to a longer DNS resolution
time but it does not significantly increase the user-perceived page
load time.
Several studies have explored approaches to breaking the pri-
vacy protection provided by encrypted DNS. Concretely, Houser
et al. [28] proposed a DoT fingerprinting method that examines
the patterns of packet size to determine if a user visits a website
that is interesting to adversaries, achieving a 17% of false negative
rate and 0.5% of false positive rate when DNS messages are not
padded. Siby et al. [47] developed a new feature set to effectively
fingerprint the visited websites and demonstrated that the traffic
analysis defenses, such as EDNS0 padding, are unable to mitigate
the proposed fingerprinting attack. Hoang et al. [24] investigated
the privacy benefits brought by encrypting domain names. They
concluded that 20% of the domains cannot gain privacy benefits
since their hostnames and the corresponding IP addresses have
a one-to-one mapping, so the IP addresses leak a user’s privacy.
Trevisan et al. [48] leveraged the plaintext DNS traffic to infer the
encrypted DNS information with a simple classification algorithm
and demonstrated the efficiency of the proposed classifier.
6.2 Internet Censorship
Recent research has studied Internet censorship in some particu-
lar countries [9, 13, 37] and demonstrated that DNS manipulation
is pervasively used in many countries for censorship. A group of
anonymous authors [8] studied the collateral damage that affects
the communication beyond the censored networks when ISPs de-
ploy censorship tools that inject forged DNS responses to block
users from accessing censored websites.
Several censorship measurement platforms have also investi-
gated global DNS manipulation. In particular, OONI [20] is a net-
work measurement platform that recruits volunteers to perform
censorship measurements, but its DNS manipulation detection is
inaccurate as it simply compares the DNS responses obtained from
the volunteers with the DNS response from a control node [41],
and Yadav et al. [51] reported that the false negative rate could
be as high as 89%. Scott et al. [46] collected information on DNS
resolution and resource availability to develop a toolchain for mea-
suring web infrastructure deployments and detecting ISP-level DNS
manipulation in the wild. Pearce et al. [42] proposed Iris, a scal-
able system for measuring and understanding the heterogeneity
of global DNS manipulation. Their work focuses on investigating
DNS manipulation at the use of unencrypted DNS resolvers, while
our work focuses on exploring DNS manipulation at the use of
encrypted DNS resolvers. More importantly, we discovered that
DNS manipulation is even more prevalent in the encrypted DNS
than that in the unencrypted DNS. Niaki et al. [39] presented ICLab,
a platform that leverages commercial VPNs as vantage points to
discover various censorship techniques, such as DNS manipulation,
TCP packet injection, and web page blocking. They found that the
majority of DNS manipulation is carried out by resolvers, rather
than on-path censorship devices, and our work further confirms
this observation.
Other than censorship detection, researchers have also proposed
approaches to circumventing censorship. Specifically, Fifield et
al. [19] proposed domain fronting, which runs circumvention prox-
ies on the web services that share IP addresses with other uncen-
sored services. Bock et al. [11] proposed Geneva, a genetic algo-
rithm that automates the discovery and circumvention of packet-
manipulation-based censorship techniques, and demonstrated its
efficiency against censors on the Internet. Bock et al. [10] further
applied the genetic algorithm at the server-side to bypass censor-
ship so that the client-side does not need any modification. As
ESNI has been proposed to bypass SNI-based censorship, Chai et
al. [14] evaluated the effectiveness of using ESNI for censorship
circumvention, and they concluded that ESNI makes more than 101
thousand websites more censorship-resistant.
Additionally, CDNBrowsing systems have been developed in
[26, 38, 52] to bypass censorship by leveraging the collateral dam-
age of IP blocking. Nisar et al. [40] implemented C-Saw, a system
that conducts censorship measurements through crowdsourced
users and provides adaptive censorship circumvention for them.
Another line of work [27, 33] leveraged Decoy routing for bridging
the connections to the censored destination through intermediate
routers. However, Schuchard et al. [45] showed that censors can
effectively block the participating routers to nullify Decoy routing.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the first comprehensive measurement
study of investigating the impact of encrypted DNS on Internet
censorship from two perspectives. On one hand, we performed a
large-scale measurement to assess the severity of DNS manipula-
tion, which can be exploited for censorship enhancement, when
adopting encrypted DNS resolvers. In particular, we conducted 7.4
million DNS lookup measurements on 3,813 DoT and 75 of DoH
resolvers, and identified that 1.66% of DoT responses and 1.42% DoH
responses suffer DNSmanipulation. More importantly, these manip-
ulated DNS responses were originated from more than two-thirds
of the DoT and DoH resolvers, showing that DNS manipulation
is more prevalent in encrypted DNS than traditional DNS. On the
other hand, we evaluated the effectiveness of using encrypted DNS
resolvers to circumvent Internet censorship. We observed that, with
the use of encrypted DNS resolvers, 37% of the censored domains
are accessible from the vantage points in China, but none of the cen-
sored domains are accessible from the vantage points in Iran. Also,
for a vantage point, using a different encrypted DNS resolver does
not generate a non-trivial difference in censorship circumvention.
Our further analysis reveals that many censored domains remain
inaccessible because they are also blocked by other censorship
techniques such as SNI-based blocking.
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A ABBREVIATION OF DOMAIN CATEGORY
Table 12: Domain Category Abbreviation.
Abbreviation Category
ADUL Other Adult Materials
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